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Abstract
Using two periods’ panel data from the Swiss Graduate Survey,
this study examines the incidence and wage eﬀects of overeducation.
Contrary to most prior research, we account for graduate heterogene-
ity in perceived skills mismatch when measuring overeducation and
correct for potential omitted ability bias in the estimated pay penalty
associated with overeducation. We ﬁnd that graduates who are overe-
ducated and mismatched in skills (i.e. genuinely overeducated) are the
most penalized in terms of earnings. This evidence is still valid when
using the ﬁxed eﬀects approach, while the pay penalty is no more
signiﬁcant for graduates who are overeducated but matched in skills
(i.e. apparently overeducated). This indicates that the wage eﬀects for
apparently overeducated graduates are mainly due to the omission of
unobserved ability.
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As in most European countries, participation in higher academic education
has increased signiﬁcantly in Switzerland since the 1990s.1 According to the
Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce (SFSO), the increase rate reaches almost 50%
between 1990 and 2009.2 Moreover, the association of the Swiss Academies
of Arts and Sciences3 claimed in a report that two thirds of the youth in
Switzerland should get a degree from a tertiary education institution by
the year 2030 (Zimmerli et al., 2009). This stand follows in part from the
fact that selected professional ﬁelds are experiencing a shortage of qualiﬁed
labour. In parallel, a signiﬁcant share of the graduate labour force has more
education than is actually required for their jobs and are referred to as overe-
ducated:4 four or ﬁve years after graduation, the incidence of overeducation
is ranging between 5% and 20% among university graduates (Storni et al.,
2008). Thus, the fostered expansion of graduates may appear meaningless
given the existing evidence of overeducation. In this study, we argue that
basic measurement methods to deﬁning educational mismatch in the labour
market are prone to imprecision since overeducated workers may have lower
skill levels and overeducation does therefore not necessarily imply skills mis-
match. As pointed out by Chevalier (2003), most prior studies have measured
educational mismatch as the diﬀerence between actual and required educa-
tion, ignoring that workers with a given level of schooling are heterogeneous
in skills. We address this measurement issue by proposing an alternative
method that incorporates both the educational and skill requirements of the
job into an improved measure of educational mismatch.
1Higher academic education institutions include cantonal universities and federal in-
stitutes of technology. There are ten cantonal universities and two federal institutes of
technology. The ten cantonal universities are in Basel, Bern, Fribourg, Geneva, Lausanne,
Lucerne, Lugano, Neuchâtel, St. Gallen and Zurich; the two federal institutes of technology
are in Lausanne (EPFL) and in Zurich (ETHZ).
2A wide range of statistics covering education in Switzerland are available at the SFSO
website (http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/themen/15.html).
3The Swiss Academies of Arts and Sciences are the association of the four Swiss
academies of sciences. Their co-operation focuses primarily on the following three ﬁelds
of competence: foresight, ethics and the dialog between science and society. More details
on this association can be found at http://www.swiss-academies.ch.
4In the literature, there exist diﬀerent corresponding terms such as overschooled or
overqualiﬁed.
2The overeducation literature tends to support the view that surplus school-
ing is a costly phenomenon, in particular for workers. Indeed, overeducation
is generally found to be associated with a notable pay penalty relative to
those adequately educated with the same level of schooling (for a review, see
Hartog, 2000; McGuinness, 2006; Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011). However,
most existing studies have relied on cross-sectional evidence when estimating
the wage eﬀects of overeducation and, therefore, have neglected that overe-
ducation may be correlated with unobserved ability.5 A growing number of
studies have indicated that the omission of unobserved ability overstates the
pay penalty for being overeducated (Bauer, 2002; Chevalier, 2003; Frenette,
2004; Verhaest and Omey, 2009; Lindley and McIntosh, 2010; Mavromaras
et al., 2010). However, almost none of these studies have attempted to bet-
ter account for worker heterogeneity when measuring educational mismatch;
exceptions are Chevalier (2003) and Mavromaras et al. (2010). The for-
mer proposes an alternative measure based on objective overeducation and
job satisfaction. Objective overeducation is derived from the job analysis
method that allows to deﬁne graduate and non-graduate occupations on the
basis of an occupational classiﬁcation (equivalent to the United States Dic-
tionary of Occupational Titles).6 Overeducation is then either apparent or
genuine, according to whether overeducated workers are satisﬁed or not with
the match between their education and their job. Analysing the determi-
nants of overeducation and its impact on wages in the UK graduate labour
market, he controls for unobserved ability through the inclusion of a proxy
in cross-sectional analyses.7 Nevertheless, we note two possible points for
improvement in his contribution: ﬁrst, the satisfaction measure is likely to
be endogenous, as it may actually reﬂect other factors than the quality of
5In econometrics, unobservables are generally called the unobserved heterogeneity (de-
scribing productivity, ability, motivation and other unobserved characteristics). Instead
we use the term ’unobserved ability’ as in the overeducation literature. In this study,
the term ’heterogeneity’ is rather devoted to addressing the implicit assumption of worker
homogeneity in basic measurement methods of educational mismatch.
6Further information on the the US Dictionary of Occupational Titles is available at
www.oalj.dol.gov/libdot.htm.
7Chevalier (2003) has constructed a measure of unobserved ability using the OLS resid-
ual from a ﬁrst-job earnings equation which correponds to the deviation between the ex-
pected and observed earnings in the ﬁrst job.
3the match;8 second, by deﬁnition, a proxy do not cover a complete range of
potentially unobservable attributes. The other contribution by Mavromaras
et al. (2010) presents a diﬀerent measure constructed from statistical overed-
ucation and subjective overskilling. Statistical overeducation is measured as
the diﬀerence between the education attainted by the worker and the modal
education attained in the worker’s occupation. Unlike Chevalier (2003), they
base the decomposition of overeducation on an explicit indicator capturing
underutilization of skills, rather than indirectly via a satisfaction measure. In
addition, they use the ﬁxed eﬀects method in order to control for unobserved
ability when studying the eﬀect of job mismatch on various labour market
outcomes for Australian university graduates. As their statistical measure of
overeducation is computed from the whole labour force, we suspect however
that their overeducation variable is subject to measurement error due to co-
hort eﬀects.9 In contrast, we rely on subjective measures of overeducation
and skills mismatch, both available in a longitudinal survey of Swiss grad-
uates conducted one and ﬁve years after graduation in 2002. We postulate
that overeducated graduates with suitable skills for their job are apparently
overeducated, whilst those with unsuitable skills are genuinely overeducated.
The same applies to adequately educated graduates: the match is apparent
if their skills do not correspond to the job, otherwise it is genuine.
Our contribution to the overeducation literature is that we account for
graduate heterogeneity in perceived skills mismatch when measuring overe-
ducation and correct for potential omitted ability bias in the estimated pay
penalty associated with overeducation. As in Mavromaras et al. (2010), we
use the longitudinal nature of our survey data for the purpose of taking into
account unobserved ability. We replicate estimates from existing studies,
based on an extended speciﬁcation of the Mincer wage equation with a single
8As pointed out by Robst (2008), job satisfaction may be a function of earnings. The
fact that low earnings can increase workers’ dissatisfaction may in part explain Chevalier’s
result that the pay penalty associated with overeducation is larger when overeducated
workers indicate low levels of satisfaction with their job.
9As pointed out by Verhaest and Omey (2006), the statistical method of measuring
educational mismatch neglects skill acquisition through experience and on-the-job training.
Accordingly, the required level of education tends to be underestimated, especially if the
statistical measure is calculated on the basis of the whole labour force (composed of workers
with diﬀerent career histories).
4dummy for graduate overeducation. Our estimates are consistent with earlier
ﬁndings: the pooled OLS estimates show that overeducation has a signiﬁcant
negative impact on earnings, while the penalty for being overeducated is still
signiﬁcant but substantially reduced with the ﬁxed eﬀects method. We then
consider another version of the wage equation that incorporates our alter-
native measure of educational mismatch. When ﬁxed unobserved ability
is controlled for, overeducated graduates with suitable skills for their job
(i.e. those apparently overeducated) earn the same return on their education
as adequately educated graduates, ceteris paribus. It means that apparently
overeducated graduates have low values of other unobserved aspects of human
capital and are then less able compared to adequately educated graduates.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The ﬁrst part of Section 2
presents the panel data from the Swiss Graduate Survey; the second part
provides an alternative method to measuring educational mismatch, while
the third part describes the econometric models and the estimation strategies
employed in the empirical analysis. The ﬁrst and second parts of Section 3
show respectively the incidence of education mismatch and the estimation
results. Section 4 summarizes the descriptive and analytical results.
2 Data and empirical methodology
This section begins with an overview of the latest data derived from the Swiss
Graduate Survey. Then, we propose an alternative measure of educational
mismatch that allows to identify whether overeducated graduates have suit-
able or unsuitable skills for their job. Finally, we consider two regression
speciﬁcations and diﬀerent panel data methods to estimate the wage eﬀects
of educational mismatch.
2.1 Data source
For the empirical analysis, we rely upon the data from the Swiss Graduate
Survey performed by the SFSO among the cohort graduated in the year 2002.
The survey’s main focus is the employment situation of graduates from higher
academic and higher vocational education in Switzerland, one and ﬁve years
after graduation. In the ﬁrst-wave survey, all graduates having successfully
5completed a degree in a recognised Swiss institution of higher education are
asked to complete a questionnaire one year after graduation. Only graduates
who participated in the ﬁrst-wave survey are asked to take part in a second-
wave survey four years later (i.e. ﬁve years after graduation). The ques-
tionnaire covers a standard set of variables capturing individual, educational
and job characteristics.10 In this study, we use a balanced panel of 4,510
individuals graduated in the year 2002 in a cantonal university or a Federal
Institute of Technology (including 538 PhD graduates), this cohort having
been surveyed a ﬁrst time in 2003 and a second time in 2007. Moreover,
we only keep graduates with a Licence or Diploma degree, working at the
time of both surveys as salaried employees and reporting valid information
for the variables of interest.11 The ﬁnal sample resulting from this selection
reaches a size of 1,370 graduates, which amounts to 2,740 observations given
the balanced nature of our panel.
2.2 Measuring educational mismatch
The ﬁrst step for deﬁning educationally mismatched graduates in the labour
market consists in identifying those overeducated. In our case, the most
convenient way comes down to derive overeducation from the graduate’s self-
assessment of educational requirement directly available in the questionnaire.
The other existing methods for measuring overeducation are indeed diﬃcult
to be implemented on the basis of our data: while the job analysis method is
actually unavailable for Switzerland, the realized matches method is generally
computed from the whole labour force.12 As noted by Chevalier (2003), the
subjective method has the advantage of adjusting the measure of overeduca-
10The response rates (referring to the ratio between the respondent sample and the
surveyed population) at the ﬁrst and second interviews are 56% and 38%, respec-
tively. Further details on the sampling methodology and questionnaires are available
at www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/themen/15.html.
11Hereafter, the eﬀect of sample selection is neglected. The detailed procedure of the
sample selection is described in Table 5 of the appendix, while Table 6 shows the descriptive
results computed from the entire sample (only university graduates without a PhD) and
the selected sample. Interestingly, most of the mean values obtained from the selected
sample do not appear to be diﬀerent from those calculated on the basis of the entire
sample.
12For a complete overview regarding each measurement method, see Hartog (2000).
6tion to the speciﬁc requirements of the job, while the objective and statistical
methods assume that all jobs within a given occupation have the same re-
quirements. In our data, overeducation is subjectively deﬁned by means of
the following question asked at each wave ’Was a degree required by your
current employer for your main job?’ with two possible answers: (1) yes or
(2) no. While the aﬃrmative answer refers to the case of adequate education,
the negative one reﬂects situations of overeducation.
Only relying on the aforementioned measure amounts to naively assume
that overeducated graduates are homogeneous in terms of skills. We reject
this assumption by adopting an improved concept of educational mismatch
based on the subjective measure of overeducation that incorporates the grad-
uate’s self-assessment of skills matching. To some extent, it amounts to ac-
count for worker heterogeneity in terms of perceived skill utilization as in
Green and Zhu (2010) and Mavromaras et al. (2010). Respondents were
asked at the ﬁrst wave ’Do you think that your job corresponds to your ed-
ucation in terms of specialized skills?’ and at the second wave ’Do you think
that your job corresponds to your education in terms of skills proﬁle of the
job’ on a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 is ’not at all’ and 5 is ’to a large extent’. Grad-
uates are considered to have inadequate skills for their job if they responded
1 or 2, whereas their skills are adequate in other cases.
The subjective measure of skills matching is used for identifying whether
skills among overeducated graduates do or do not correspond to the job. It
also serves to distinguish adequately educated graduates that are matched
in skills from those being mismatched in skills. Accordingly, it allows to
determine if the self-reported states of adequate education and overeduca-
tion are either genuine or apparent.13 Overeducated graduates that assess
their skills as unsuitable (resp. suitable) for the job are deﬁned as genuinely
(resp. apparently) overeducated. Identically, adequately educated graduates
that assess their skills as unsuitable are deﬁned as apparently matched, the
remainder of this group being genuinely matched. Table 1 summarizes how
the subjective measure of educational mismatch is disaggregated into four
13Instead of utilizing the ’formal/real’ duality as in Green and Zhu (2010), we rely on
the corresponding ’apparent/genuine’ duality introduced by Chevalier (2003).
7possible categories.14










2.3 Wage eﬀects of educational mismatch
For estimating the impact of overeducation on earnings, we use an extended
version of the Mincer wage equation often used in the literature on overe-
ducation in the graduate labour market (e.g. Dolton and Vignoles, 2000;
Chevalier, 2003; Frenette, 2004; McGuinness and Bennett, 2007; Dolton and
Silles, 2008; Green and Zhu, 2010):
lnwit = oOit + 1Xit + 2X
2
it + Eit + it (1)
where wit corresponds to gross hourly earnings for individual i at wave t, Oit
is a dummy for self-assessed overeducation, Xit the potential work experi-
ence in month since graduation15 and Eit a vector of personal characteristics
14Green and Zhu (2010) consider also four types of matching status: ’matched’ (i.e. ade-
quate qualiﬁcation and skills fully utilized), ’qualiﬁcation matched and skills underutilized’,
’formal overqualiﬁcation’ (i.e. overqualiﬁcation and skills fully utilized) and ’real overqual-
iﬁcation’ (i.e. overqualiﬁcation and skills underutilized). Mavromaras et al. (2010) employ
a comparable typology: ’well-matched’ (i.e. matched in both education and skills), ’only
overskilled’, ’only overeducated’ and ’overeducated and overskilled’.
15Potential work experience is equal to the diﬀerence between the date of respective wave
and the date of the ﬁrst job after graduation. Actual work experience is also available, as
it can be calculated from the graduate’s career history; however, the exclusion of graduates
with incomplete career history generates too many missing observations (at least 20% of
our ﬁnal sample in Table 5).
8ﬁxed at graduation including the type of higher academic institution, ac-
tual length of study, average grade at graduation, non study-related work
experience acquired during studies, study-related work experience acquired
during studies, gender and foreign nationality. This speciﬁcation with a sin-
gle dummy for graduate overeducation is actually a special case of the one
proposed by Verdugo and Verdugo (1989) which includes both dummies for
being over- or undereducated. According to equation 1, overeducated grad-
uates are compared to graduates who are adequately educated. Dolton and
Vignoles (2000) proposed a formal test of the human capital theory in the
context of the graduate labour market, stating that the job’s educational re-
quirements do not matter in the wage determination process. In other words,
overeducated graduates should earn the same return on their education as
graduates who are adequately educated, ceteris paribus: o = 0. If, how-
ever, wages are determined by the job’s educational requirement, the returns
to excess schooling would tend to zero and, thus, overeducated graduates
would earn less than adequately educated graduates: o < 0. As in most
earlier studies dealing with educational mismatch among the whole labour
force (for a general survey of this literature, see Hartog, 2000; McGuinness,
2006; Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2011), Dolton and Vignoles (2000) reject the
human capital hypothesis, in particular overeducated workers suﬀer from a
pay penalty compared to those comparably educated who are adequately
educated.
If the assumption that overeducation is uncorrelated with unobserved
ability does not hold, cross-sectional estimation of equation 1 by OLS would
be subject to the problem of omitted variable bias since overeducation
would be correlated with the error term. Accordingly, we modify the error
term it in the wage equation in order to include unobserved ability ci:
it = ci + uit
where uit are the i.i.d. errors. Given the longitudinal aspect of our data, a
ﬁxed eﬀects analysis seems appropriate;16 indeed, it allows for ci to be arbi-
trarily correlated with the explanatory variables since its main assumption
16Another method to address the problem of omitted variable bias is the use of instru-
mental variables (IV). As pointed by Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011), it is however very
diﬃcult to apply this method, in particular to ﬁnd convincing instruments for educational






for t = 1;:::;T. If overducation Oit and unobserved ability ci are negatively
correlated, then the cross-sectional estimate of o is upward biased. Con-
trolling for unobserved ability should therefore reduce the estimated wage
penalty associated with graduate overeducation: OLS
o < FE
o  0. Few
papers have controlled for unobserved ability when estimating equation 1
(Frenette, 2004) or the Verdugo and Verdugo’s speciﬁcation (including dum-
mies for being over- or undereducated) on the basis of the whole labour force
(Bauer, 2002).17 Using the ﬁxed eﬀects method to account for unobserved
ability, Bauer (2002) and Frenette (2004) have shown that overeducation has
little if any impact on earnings.18
Other studies have estimated another version of equation 1 where the
single dummy for overeducation is replaced by a vector of dummies includ-
ing diﬀerent types of mismatch (see Chevalier, 2003; Green and Zhu, 2010;
Mavromaras et al., 2010). To some extent, we rely on a similar equation that
incorporates our alternative measure of educational mismatch:
lnwit = amAMit + aoAOit + goGOit + 1Xit + 2X
2
it + Eit + it (2)
where AMit is a dummy for apparent match (i.e. adequate education with un-
suitable skills), AOit dummy for apparent overeducation (i.e. overeducation
mismatch. The study by Korpi and Tåhlin (2009) is among the few studies that attempt to
estimate the returns to over- and undereducation using the instrumental variables method;
while their IV results give support to the job competition model (i.e. wages are entirely
determined by required education), the use of weak instruments is likely to cast doubt on
the robustess of their estimates.
17Other studies have controlled for unobserved ability when estimating returns to edu-
cational mismatch. Korpi and Tåhlin (2009) have relied on the ORU (Over-, Required and
Undereducation) equation introduced by Duncan and Hoﬀman (1981); this speciﬁcation
corresponds to the Mincer wage equation where actual years of education are decomposed
into years of required education, years of overeducation and years of undereducation. See
also working papers by Verhaest and Omey (2009) and Lindley and McIntosh (2010) that
have relied on modiﬁed versions of the ORU speciﬁcation.
18Using ﬁxed eﬀects, Korpi and Tåhlin (2009) have found that the return to overeduca-
tion decreases but still remains smaller than the return to required education. Verhaest
and Omey (2009) and Lindley and McIntosh (2010) have shown that the estimates of the
overeducation penalty are lower for the FE model than the RE or pooled OLS models,
but they do not disappear.
10with suitable skills) and GOit dummy for genuine overeducation (i.e. overedu-
cation with unsuitable skills). Apparently matched, apparently overeducated
and genuinely overeducated graduates are thus compared to graduates who
are genuinely matched (i.e. adequately educated with suitable skills). Given
that apparently overeducated graduates work in jobs commensurate with
their skills, they should face a more moderate penalty than those mismatched
in both education and skills (i.e. genuinely overeducated) who are unable to
fully utilize the human capital acquired in university: go < ao < 0.19
This argument is consistent with ﬁndings from Chevalier (2003), Green and
Zhu (2010) and Mavromaras et al. (2010), who have shown that apparently
overeducated graduates suﬀer from a lower pay penalty compared to those
genuinely overeducated.20
What would happen if we estimate equation 2 after controlling for un-
observed ability? We argue that apparently overeducated graduates are
less able compared to those adequately matched, since they are in non-
graduates jobs but their skills correspond to the job. Accordingly, their
pay penalty should tend to disappear when controlling for unobserved abil-
ity: OLS
ao < FE
ao  0.21 Few studies that propose an alternative measure
of educational mismatch also control for unobserved ability when estimating
the wage equation. Among them are the studies of Chevalier (2003) and
Mavromaras et al. (2010). Including a proxy of unobserved ability in a cross-
sectional regression, Chevalier (2003) have reached the conclusion that the
wage eﬀects to apparent and genuine overeducation remain signiﬁcant even if
they are both reduced by a small fraction. Using a representative sample of
the whole graduate labour force (as opposed to our sample which is represen-
tative of a speciﬁc cohort of graduates making their transition from university
to work), Mavromaras et al. (2010) have, in contrast, not found a signiﬁcant
pay penalty for men who are matched in skills but overeducated (i.e. appar-
19The same reasoning applies to apparently matched graduates, i.e. go < am < 0,
since they work in jobs commensurate with their education.
20Green and Zhu (2010) and Mavromaras et al. (2010) have also indicated that gradutes
who are matched in education but overskilled (i.e. apparently matched) experience lower
pay penalties than those overeducated and overskilled at the same time (i.e. genuinely
overeducated).
21This argument also works for apparently matched graduates, i.e. OLS
am < FE
am  0.
11ently overeducated) or matched in education but overskilled (i.e. apparently
matched) after controlling for unobserved ability in ﬁxed eﬀects analysis.
In the empirical analysis, we test diﬀerent hypotheses about the impacts
of educational mismatch on earnings that crucially depend on the assumption
about the correlation between overeducation and unobserved ability.
Hypothesis 1: The pay penalty associated with self-assessed overeducation
is signiﬁcantly positive when unobserved ability is omitted.
Hypothesis 2: When self-assessed overeducation is decomposed according
to whether skills do or do not correspond to the job, the pay penalty
associated with apparent overeducation is lower compared to the pay
penalty associated with genuine overeducation.
Hypothesis 3: The pay penalty associated with self-assessed overeducation
is reduced (even non-signiﬁcant) when unobserved ability is controlled
for.
Hypothesis 4: The pay penalty associated with apparent overeducation is
reduced (even non-signiﬁcant) when unobserved ability is controlled
for.
All the tested hypotheses are reformulated in Table 2 according to which
estimation strategy is employed (OLS vs FE) and whether the wage equation
includes a single dummy for overeducation or a vector of dummies including
diﬀerent types of educational mismatch.




Ordinary Least Squares Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2
o < 0 go < ao < 0
Fixed Eﬀects Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 4
OLS
o < FE
o  0 OLS
ao < FE
ao  0
12Equations 1 and 2 are estimated using diﬀerent econometric techniques:
[i] the Pooled Ordinary Least Squares with robust standard errors; [ii] the
Random and Fixed Eﬀects, where it = ci + uit and t = 1;2. The ﬁxed
eﬀects approach will only identify the wage eﬀects of educational mismatch
from information on graduates who change their matching status. This is a
very attractive feature in our case since identiﬁcation does not need to rely
on individual variation in the level of education.22 The dependent variable
is the natural logarithm of gross hourly earnings in the respondent’s current
job.23 Pooled ordinary least squares and random eﬀects regression models
include all the time-invariant and time-varying covariates and a dummy for
the second year of interview. When estimating previous equations with the
ﬁxed eﬀects procedure, only the time-varying controls are introduced (i.e.
potential work experience since graduation and potential work experience
since graduation squared).24 All the explanatory variables are presented
in Table 7, while descriptive sample statistics are presented in the second
column of Table 6 and in Table 8 (see the appendix).
22Individual variation in the level of education is generally required for identifying the
ﬁxed eﬀects estimates of the returns to over/required/underschooling from the ORU speci-
ﬁcation; otherwise, individual variation in years of over/required/underschooling is charac-
terized by perfect multicollinearity for persons with constant actual schooling (since actual
years of schooling are decomposed into years of required schooling, years of overschooling
and years of underschooling).
23We derive gross hourly earnings (deﬂated into 2000 Swiss francs) by dividing the
reported gross annual wage by the reported number of contractual hours worked per
week, multiplied by 13 (months) and 4.3 (weeks). Note that the calculated gross hourly
wage is likely to contain measurement error since the respondent may not work the entire
year. Measurement error in the dependent variable can cause biases in cross-sectional and
panel estimations if it is correlated with one or more of the explanatory variables. In
order to obtain unbiased estimators, all estimation results reported below have also been
performed on the basis of a sample of graduates working full-time at each interview wave.
This procedure reduces the sample to 868 gradutes observed in each panel wave (i.e. 1,736
observations). The main ﬁndings of the empirical analysis do not change when graduates
working part-time are excluded from the sample. The estimation results when excluding
graduates working part-time are presented in Table 12 (see the appendix).
24The dummy for the year of second interview and the potential experience variable are
nearly perfectly linearly related, so the year dummy is excluded.
133 Results
This section includes the results regarding the incidence and wage eﬀects of
educational mismatch in the Swiss labour market, where the mismatch vari-
able either corresponds to self-reported overeducation (basic measurement
method) or is derived from a combination of self-reported overeducation and
perceived skill mismatch (alternative measurement method).
3.1 Incidence of educational mismatch
Table 3 presents the incidence of educational mismatch one and ﬁve years
after graduation. It also gives information about the changes occurring in
the matching status between both interviews.
According to the basic measure, a minority of graduates are overeducated
and their share reaches 16% in 2003. This proportion has signiﬁcantly de-
creased four years later: at least one out of ten graduates are overeducated in
2007. It appears that these proportions are generally below those computed
in other studies of graduate overeducation: Frenette (2004) found that at
least 30% of Canadian graduates are overeducated; Green and Zhu (2010)
provided rates of overeducation ranging between 23% and 33% among UK
graduates; rates presented by Mavromaras et al. (2010) for Australian grad-
uates are ranging between 14% and 23%. Finally, it is worth noting that 40%
of overeducated graduates in 2003 are still overeducated in 2007 (i.e. 6% of
all the graduates in our sample); in other words, a change from overeducation
to adequate education is observed for a large share of graduates (about 60%
of those overeducated in 2003).25
When overeducated graduates are disaggregated depending on perceived
skills mismatch, it turns out that half of them are in a situation of genuine
overeducation one year after graduation. Only three out of ten overedu-
cated graduates are in such a situation four years later. Indeed, the share of
genuinely overeducated graduates is signiﬁcantly reduced between the ﬁrst
and the second interviews. Among the whole graduate population in our
sample, it corresponds to a proportion of 8% in 2003 decreasing up to 3%
25For more details on the transition process from overeducation to adequation education
and vice versa, see Tables 9 and 10 of the appendix.
14in 2007. The low proportion of genuinely overeducated graduates is in line
with the fact that there is a shortage of qualiﬁed labour in Switzerland (Huth,
2004; Schellenbauer et al., 2010). Interestingly, these proportions of genuinely
overeducated graduates are comparable to those found in the UK (Chevalier,
2003; Green and Zhu, 2010) and Australia (Mavromaras et al., 2010). While
there is no signiﬁcant change in the incidence of apparent match or apparent
overeducation between 2003 and 2007, we observe a large amount of varia-
tion within each group of mismatched graduates during this lapse of time.26
For instance, 86% of genuinely overeducated graduates in 2003 moved into
another matching category in 2007; this means that genuine overeducation is
a permanent state for very few graduates (i.e. only 1.2% of all the graduates
in our sample). The substantial variation in each mismatch status is some
good news for identifying the wage eﬀects of educational mismatch in the
ﬁxed eﬀects model.
Table 3: Incidence and changes of educational mismatch (col. proportions)
Year of interview Changes in
2003 2007 matching status
Basic measure
Overeducated 0.158 0.109** 0.597
(0.366) (0.311)
Alternative measure
Apparently matched 0.084 0.076 0.817
(0.277) (0.265)
Apparently overeducated 0.077 0.078 0.667
(0.266) (0.268)
Genuinely overeducated 0.081 0.031** 0.856
(0.273) (0.172)
Observations 1,370 1,370
Source: Swiss Graduate Survey 2002, data are unweighted.
Notes: Standard deviation in parentheses; test for a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in proportions
across both samples (** p<0.05, * p<0.10).
26Table 11 of the appendix provides with precision the transition process from one
matching category to another.
15Table 4: Wage eﬀects of educational mismatch: Panel results
POLS FE RE
Wage equation (1)
Overeducated -0.109** -0.048** -0.094**
(0.017) (0.020) (0.014)
Observations 2,740 2,740 2,740
Number of i 1,370 1,370 1,370
Adjusted R2 0.204
Overall R2 0.153 0.209
Hausman test 17.67**
Wage equation (2)
Apparently matched -0.052** -0.008 -0.039**
(0.016) (0.021) (0.016)
Apparently overeducated -0.083** -0.019 -0.068**
(0.022) (0.024) (0.017)
Genuinely overeducated -0.158** -0.087** -0.140**
(0.024) (0.026) (0.020)
H01: GO = AM 17.89** 6.43** 17.59**
H02: GO = AO 8.59** 5.16** 8.90**
H03: AM = AO 1.91 0.14 1.72
H04: AM = AO = 0 15.08** 0.39 19.92**
Observations 2,740 2,740 2,740
Number of i 1,370 1,370 1,370
Adjusted R2 0.209
Overall R2 0.157 0.214
Hausman test 23.70**
Standard errors in parentheses, POLS with robust standard errors,
** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Source: Swiss Graduate Survey 2002, data are unweighted.
Additional controls are unreported.
Note: Hausman tests on the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients in the ram-
dom eﬀects model and the ﬁxed eﬀects model are the same could be
rejected for all speciﬁcations at least at the 1% level.
163.2 Wage eﬀects of educational mismatch
Table 4 displays the estimation results of equations 1 and 2. At ﬁrst, we focus
our attention on the pooled OLS regression analysis according to which grad-
uate overeducation and unobserved ability are assumed to be uncorrelated.
The pooled OLS estimate derived from equation 1 shows that overeducated
graduates earn 10.3% less than adequately educated graduates.27 As in most
earlier studies, this result gives support to Hypothesis 1 stating a signiﬁ-
cant wage penalty associated with graduate overeducation, which means that
the human capital hypothesis is rejected. Pooled OLS estimates derived from
equation 2 suggest that all types of mismatch negatively aﬀect earnings, the
eﬀect of genuine overeducation being the most detrimental with a wage loss of
14.6%. In line with Chevalier (2003), Green and Zhu (2010) and Mavromaras
et al. (2010), the impact of genuine overeducation on earnings is signiﬁcantly
more negative than for apparent overeducation. Hypothesis 2 is conﬁrmed
by the rejection of the null hypothesis H02: GO = AO using the F statistic.
In other words, the large diﬀerence observed in pay penalty reinforces the
view that overeducated graduates cannot be considered as a homogeneous
group. While apparent match is also associated with a negative penalty, the
size of this penalty is much smaller than for genuine overeducation (the null
hypothesis H01: GO = AM is rejected according to the F statistic). Inter-
estingly, the non-rejection of the null hypothesis H03: AM = AO proves that
apparent overeducation and apparent match have similar eﬀects on wages.
At this stage, we only discuss the ﬁxed eﬀects estimates as this model is
more eﬃcient than the random eﬀects model given that unobserved ability is
correlated with each explanatory variable (the Hausman test is rejected for
all speciﬁcations of the wage equation). In accordance with Hypothesis 3,
the ﬁxed eﬀects estimate of overeducation derived from equation 1 is much
lower than in the case of the pooled OLS model: overeducated graduates earn
4.7% less than adequately educated graduates. Therefore, the human capital
hypothesis is still rejected even if the ﬁxed eﬀects estimate provide some
evidence that the wage penalty associated with graduate overeducation can
be partially explained by unobserved ability. Fixed eﬀects estimates derived
27Given the log-linear form of the wage equation, the percentage eﬀect of graduate
overeducation is calculated as eo   1.
17from equation 2 indicate that only genuinely overeducated graduates suﬀer
from a signiﬁcant pay penalty, reaching 8.3%. This result gives support to
Hypothesis 4 since the impact of apparent overeducation on earnings is no
more signiﬁcant when controlling for ﬁxed unobserved ability.28 Accordingly,
a substantial fraction of the overeducated graduates have unobserved ability
that allows them to work in jobs commensurate with their human capital.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the incidence and wage eﬀects of educational
mismatch among Swiss graduates making their transition from university to
labour market, on the basis of the latest panel data from the Swiss Grad-
uate Survey. While basic measures of overeducation in most earlier studies
exclusively refers to the concept of excess schooling, we have gone a step fur-
ther by considering an improved measure of overeducation that accounts for
graduate heterogeneity in perceived skills mismatch. Graduates that have re-
ported being overeducated but actually work in jobs that match their skills
are deﬁned as apparently overeducated, otherwise they are taken for gen-
uinely overeducated since they are mismatched in both education and skills.
This distinction is particularly important when estimating the wage eﬀects
overeducation, given that genuinely overeducated graduates cannot use most
of their human capital in their job compared to those apparently overedu-
cated. Another important contribution with respect to the literature is to
solve the problem of unobserved ability bias. Indeed, most prior ﬁndings are
based on the assumption that overeducation is uncorrelated with unobserved
ability. Since our panel data allow us to relax this assumption, we are able
to reassess the result according to which overeducation is associated with a
signiﬁcant pay penalty.
While Switzerland is facing a shortage of qualiﬁed labour, at least 10%
of Swiss graduates work in a non-graduate job ﬁve years after graduation.
It means that the Swiss educational system, on the one hand, needs to pro-
28Note that the penalties associated with apparent match and apparent overeducation
are jointly equal to zero; this evidence is indeed conﬁrmed by the non-rejection of the null
hypothesis H04: AM = AO = 0 using the F statistic.
18duce more graduates and, on the other hand, produces too many graduates.
The coexistence of these phenomena originates from the fact that 70% of
overeducated graduates are matched in skills (i.e. apparently overeducated),
the remaining 30% being mismatched in both education and skills (i.e. gen-
uinely overeducated). The latter category actually represents around 3% of
all graduates. Moreover, genuine overeducation appears to persist for very
few graduates over time. This low persistence is consistent with the view
that genuine mismatch may be the manifestation of frictions in the labour
market.
In a second step, we have estimated the impact of self-assessed overed-
ucation on earnings using cross-sectional and panel estimation techniques.
While the OLS method is based on the assumption that overeducation is
uncorrelated with unobserved ability, the use of the FE method allows for
unobserved ability to be correlated with overeducation. Whatever which
estimation method is applied, our results give support to previous studies:
self-reported overeducation is associated with a signiﬁcant pay penalty, the
OLS estimate being about twice the size of the FE estimate. We have then
estimated an augmented speciﬁcation where graduate overeducation is dis-
aggregated according to perceived skills mismatch. In line with Chevalier
(2003), Green and Zhu (2010) and Mavromaras et al. (2010), genuinely overe-
ducated graduates are less rewarded than those apparently overeducated, ce-
teris paribus. This result is veriﬁed within both OLS and FE frameworks.
Moreover, the FE analysis reveals that only genuinely overeducated grad-
uates face a sizeable wage loss. In other words, controlling for unobserved
ability shows that the wage eﬀect of overeducation is independent of the
job requirements when graduates are matched in skills. Consistent with the
human capital hypothesis, apparent overeducation substitutes for other un-
observed aspects of human capital, such as innate ability. This indicates that
the wage eﬀects for apparently overeducated graduates are mainly due to a
lack of account for unobserved ability.
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A Appendix
Table 5: Graduates of higher academic education retained in the analysis
Jointly surveyed in both interviews No. of i %
All respondents 4,510 100.0
Valid information on whether employed or not 4,501 99.8
Employed* 3,590 79.6
Valid information on employment status 3,548 78.7
Salaried employees** 2,062 45.7
Valid information on self-assessed overeducation 2,044 45.3
Valid information on self-assessed overskilling 2,022 44.8
Valid information on potential exp. since graduation 1,981 43.9
Valid information on gross hourly earnings 1,709 37.9
Graduates without a PhD 1,478 32.8
Valid information on length of study 1,461 32.4
Valid information on average grade 1,370 30.4
Source : Swiss Graduate Survey 2002, data are unweighted.
* We exclude individuals who reported being unemployed or not in the labour force.
** We exclude individuals who reported being self-employed, in trainee jobs or PhD
students.
22Table 6: Characteristics at graduation: Summary statistics
Entire sample* Selected sample
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Gender
Women 0.489 0.500 0.466 0.499
Nationality
Foreign 0.074 0.262 0.059 0.236
Length of study (semesters) 10.317 2.505 10.577 2.581
share of missing 0.076
Average grade at graduation 0.568 0.209 0.565 0.202
share of missing 0.010
Higher academic education
Federal Institutes of Technology 0.182 0.386 0.225 0.418
Non study-related work experience
during higher education (x1)
Missing value 0.100 0.300 0.061 0.240
x1 = 0 years 0.325 0.468 0.353 0.478
0 years < x1  2 years 0.402 0.490 0.400 0.490
2 years < x1  4 years 0.103 0.305 0.104 0.306
4 years < x1 0.069 0.253 0.081 0.273
Study-related work experience
during higher education (x2)
Missing value 0.092 0.290 0.054 0.226
x2 = 0 years 0.296 0.456 0.258 0.438
0 years < x2  2 years 0.438 0.496 0.466 0.499
2 years < x2  4 years 0.108 0.310 0.134 0.340
4 years < x2 0.066 0.249 0.088 0.284
Observations 3,972 1,370
Standard deviation in parentheses
Source: Swiss Graduate Survey 2002, data are unweighted.
* University graduates without a PhD.
23Table 7: Explanatory variables included in the empirical analysis
Variable Reference cat.












Federal Institutes of Technology
Length of study (semesters) continuous variable
Average grade (0  gi  1) continuous variable
Non study-related work experience
during higher education
Missing value
No experience (x1 = 0) 
0 years < x1  2 years
2 years < x1  4 years




No experience (x2 = 0) 
0 years < x2  2 years
2 years < x2  4 years
4 years < x2
Potential work experience since
graduation (months)











Source: Swiss Graduate Survey 2002.
24Table 8: Characteristics since graduation: Summary statistics
Year of interview 2003 2007 Total
Overeducation (Oi)
Mean 0.158 0.109 0.133
S.D. 0.366 0.311 0.340
Apparent match (AMi)
Mean 0.084 0.076 0.080
S.D. 0.277 0.265 0.271
Apparent overeducation (AOi)
Mean 0.077 0.078 0.077
S.D. 0.266 0.268 0.267
Genuine overeducation (GOi)
Mean 0.081 0.031 0.056
S.D. 0.273 0.172 0.230
Gross hourly earnings (Swiss francs)
Mean 33.233 40.018 36.625
S.D. 7.974 9.952 9.633
Potential work experience since
graduation (months)
Mean 9.601 53.333 31.467
S.D. 4.413 4.478 22.317
Observations 1,370 1,370 2,740
Source: Swiss Graduate Survey 2002, data are unweighted.
25Table 9: Changes in overeducation from 2003 to 2007
Basic measure Overeducated one year
after graduation (2003)
Status ﬁve years
after graduation (2007) Observations Proportions
Adequately educated 129 0.597
Overeducated 87 0.403
Total 216 1.000
Source: Swiss Graduate Survey 2002, data are unweighted.
Bold: 40% of overeducated graduates in 2003 are still overeducated
in 2007.
Table 10: Changes in adequate education from 2003 to 2007
Basic measure Adequately educated one year
after graduation (2003)
Status ﬁve years
after graduation (2007) Observations Proportions
Adequately educated 1,092 0.946
Overeducated 62 0.054
Total 1,154 1.000
Source: Swiss Graduate Survey 2002, data are unweighted.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27Table 12: Wage eﬀects of educational mismatch: Panel results
based on graduates working full-time at each interview wave
POLS FE RE
Wage equation (1)
Overeducated -0.084** -0.045** -0.072**
(0.019) (0.022) (0.016)
Observations 1,36 1,736 1,736
Number of i 868 868 868
Adjusted R2 0.309
Overall R2 0.207 0.315
Hausman test 17.52**
Wage equation (2)
Apparently matched -0.025 -0.008 -0.019
(0.021) (0.022) (0.018)
Apparently overeducated -0.052** -0.026 -0.045**
(0.022) (0.026) (0.019)
Genuinely overeducated -0.145** -0.079** -0.122**
(0.030) (0.031) (0.024)
H01: GO = AM 11.46** 3.92** 12.89**
H02: GO = AO 6.55** 2.47 7.25**
H03: AM = AO 0.86 0.29 1.11
H04: AM = AO = 0 3.41** 0.53 6.27**
Observations 1,736 1,736 1,736
Number of i 868 868 868
Adjusted R2 0.312
Overall R2 0.211 0.319
Hausman test 19.97**
Standard errors in parentheses, POLS with robust standard errors,
** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Source: Swiss Graduate Survey 2002, data are unweighted.
Additional controls are unreported.
Note: Hausman tests on the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients in the ram-
dom eﬀects model and the ﬁxed eﬀects model are the same could be
rejected for all speciﬁcations at least at the 1% level.
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